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In the Suprenie Court 
of the State o.f Utah 
CARL T. EVANS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PICKETT BROS. FARMS, a 
Partnership, and JESS W. PICKETT, 
otherwise known as J. W. Pickett, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 12616 
This is a case based upon an old agreement for le-
veling land, with a disagreement on final price, and 
failure to pay the matter in full, based on either party's 
interpretation. The statute of limitations is the primary 
question involved. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the lower court on the 
10th of May, 1971, without a jury, the Honorable J: Har-
lan Burns presiding, and was completed in a matter of 
approximately two hours. Thereafter, the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns took the matter under advisement, and on 
the 9th of June, 1971, rendered a memorandum decisio 
in which he found that Exhibit No. 1 changed the coi: 
tract from an oral contract to a sufficiently writte
11 
agreement for Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 195.1 
to be applicable thereto. This item coupled with par 
ment on a later date, or a tender of payment on a la~1 
date, was interpreted by the Court as extending thi 
matter past the time of filing the complaint under thi 
six-year statute of limitations, and judgment for t~ 
plaintiff was awarded. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants and appellants desire that the dee:· 
sion be reversed, and that the complaint be dismissec 
with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During 1959 there was a negotiation between Je~ 
W. Picket, representing himself and a brother ~ 
Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership, and the plaintiff. Thi 
exact dates of the negotiation are not certain. As a r~ 
sult of the negotiation, an oral agreement was enteret 
into whereby approximately 40 acres of land was to~· 
leveled by Mr. Evans for Pickett Bros. Farms with Agri 
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (A.S.C. 
participation as to part of the payment, and Soil Con 
servation Service to provide the engineering. The nece'· 
sary applications were made by Mr. Pickett to A.S.C. for 
their participation, The leveling was performed in' 
more or less satisfactory manner, plaintiff contendirir 
that it was strictly in accordance with the contract 0 
$10.00 an hour, the defendants contending that an esti· 
mate of approximately $2100.00 was the agreed price 
' ' .>Jt;;..~ 
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based upon whatever oral agreement had gone before 
them. The work was done in October and 'November of 
1959. and was completed November 29, 1959. Thereafter, 
on 14 December, 1959, the defendant, J. W. Pickett sign-
ed for Pickett Bros. Farms by himself and dated said doc-
ument 14 December, 1959, a purchase order for conserva-
tion materials on forms provided oy the ·A.s.c. A copy 
of this document has been entered in evidence as Ex-
hibit 1. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-
tion Service paid $1,000. On April 25, 1969, the defend-
ants paid $100; on 3 September, 1961, $300.00, the check 
for which is marked Exhibit 2, · and another check also 
marked Exhibit 2 was tendered on 2 January, 1962, in 
the amount of $700 with a statement on the back, "Full 
and Final Payment." This check was never cashed by 
the plaintiff. It appears that there are two Exhibits 1 
and two Exhibits 2, the check for $100.00 being one Ex-
hibit 1, and the A.S.C. order being the other Exhibit 1; 
the check for $300.00 being one exhibit 2, and the check 
for $700.00 being the other exhibit 2. The trial court 
treated these items as follows: Plaintiff's Exhibit!, A.S.C. 
order of 14 December, 1959; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, the 
check for $300.00 dated 2 September, 1961; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3. the check for $700.00 dated 2 January, 1962 
that was not cashed. The complaint was filed on Octo-
ber 11, 1967, commencing this action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE IS 
TITLE 78-12-25 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
The trial court ruled that Exhibit 1, being the pay-
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ment order of the Agricultural Stabilization and Con-
servation Service dated 14 December, 1959, constituted 
a sufficient document in writing to be a contract and 
to invoke the six-year statute of limitations, to-wit, 78· 
12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, rather than the four· 
year state of limitations contended by the defendants. 
The defendant had plead both of these statutes as a bar 
to the action. The Court, in applying this statute then 
ruled that the tender of the last check for $700.00, to· 
wit, Exqibit 3, also made the six-year application to this 
check~,eXl:ended it a sufficient period of time so that the 
finding by the Court of the absence of Mr. Pickett from 
the state of Utah from January 2, 1962, to April 1, 196~, 
and other periods on which the Court did not elaborate, 
commenced running on the statute on 3 September, 1961, 
when the last payment was made, and that the absenres 
thereafter held the statute sufficiently to have the fil· 
ing of October 11, 1967, within the six-year period which 
the Court contended was the proper application under 
Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that Ex· 
hibit 1 also made this a six-year statute. 
Under these conditions, the primary question is whe· 
ther there was an oral agreement or a written agree· 
men. To commence with, the Court, in Finding No. 2, 
made a finding that the contract made during October 
of 1959 was orally negotiated, and that it was orally 
agreed that the plaintiff would be paid by said defend· 
ants the sum of $10.00 per hour for the time plaintiff 
spent in operating his land-leveling equipment, and 
performing said land-leveling, a portion of which would 
be paid by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva· 
tion Service, and the balance would be paid by the de· 
fendant. The Court further found in Finding No. 3 that 
pursuant to the oral negotiations the plaintiff did the 
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work between November 1, 1959, and November 29, 1959. 
This is verified in the transcript on Page 41, commenc-
ing with Line 2, and ending on Line 6. Also, the plead-
ings, which have not been amended in any way, show 
that this was an oral agreement. While in Paragraph 3 
of the complaint a written agreement is plead, the at-
tachment to the complaint shows that this was the item 
that is Exhibit J and was the payment order of the Ag-
ricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. The 
answer of the defendants filed in personum pleads an 
or<i l contract. The supplemental answer of the defend-
ants pleads an oral agreement, and pleads both the six-
year and four-year statute of limitations, as well as ten-
der and refus;-il. The plaintiff's reply to supplemental 
answer of the defendants admitted and alleged an oral 
agreement on or about the 1st of November, 1959. None 
of these pleadings are amended, nor at the conclusion 
of the trial was any motion made to amend the plead-
ing in conformity with the trial, or the findings, and 
the findings find the oral agreement prior to the 29th of 
November, 1959, and the completion by that date. 
Under these conditions, the next question is wheth-
er or not there was any written agreement pertaining 
to the A.S.C. payment order signed by Mr. Pickett on 13 
December, 1959. This actually amounts to nothing but or 
an order to pay. A check is a statement to the bank to 
pay This is a statement to the A.S.C. to pay, and pay-
ment was made thereon, just exactly the same as if it 
had been a check. Was this a sufficient item in writing to 
change the oral agreement from the four-year to the 
six-year statute of limitations? The State of Utah in 
the S11pr'me Court thereof has many times ruled that 
items of this nature are not sufficient items in writing 
to make this change, Paragraph (2) of Title 78-12-23, 
Utah Coclp Annotated, 1953, reads as follows: 
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"An action upon any contract, obligation or lia-
bility founded upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in the preceding sec-
tion." 
Under these conditions, this is not an action on a con· 
tract founded on an instrument in writing. At no place 
had Mr. Evans, the plaintiff, signed this document, nor 
was it intended or ever used for anything but an order 
to pay, nor does it in any way change the terms of the 
oral agreement admitted by both parties. There are 
many cases of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
that have interpreted items of this nature all to be noth· 
ing that changed the oral contract. One of these cases 
is Whitehill vs. Lowe, found in 10 Utah 419 and 427, and 
at 37 P. 589. In this case the plaintiff contended that 
through two verbal agreements he had an interest in a 
written agreement. The Court held that the four-year 
statute applied and was in effect. 
In the case of Woolf vs. Gray, 48 Utah 239, 158 P. 
788, there was a cause of action for goods and merchan· 
dise on an account stated. In this matter a partner of 
the concern which had run the account for goods :uid 
merchandise had confessed judgment and judgment had 
been granted against the partner. In this case the Su· 
preme Court of the State of Utah held that even though 
the partner had confessed judgment and the judgment 
had been entered, this was not sufficient to extend the 
four-year statute of limitations against the other partner 
who had not confessed judgment, and in no way effected 
his liability and that the four-year statute of limitation 
applied. 
In the case of O'Donnell vs. Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160 
P. 1192, the defendant owed an open account to the 
plaintiff. The defendant had taken bankruptcy and even 
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though outlawed, had listed the amount of the open 
account in one of the schedules to be barred by the 
bankruptcy. However, thereafter the bankruptcy failed. 
The question there was whether or not the listing in the 
bankruptcy over a sworn signature of the defendant 
was sufficient to extend the four-year statute of limi-
tations, or to take it out of the four-year statute of limi-
itations and make the six-year statute of limitations 
apply, and the Court held "No", that it had nothing to 
do with the matter and that it did not extend any stat-
ute of limitations and did not make the six-year statute 
apply. This is very similar to the case at bar. An order 
to pay has been interpreted by the trial court as tak-
ing it outside of the four-year statute and making it 
into the six-year statute so that the six-year statute 
would apply. Certainly, this is no greater acknowledg-
ment of debt than the listing of the same in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
In the matter of Jeremy Fuel & Grain Company vs. 
Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. found in 60 Utah 153 and 
in 207 P. 155, this is an action to recover 35c a ton on 
excess freight charges on coal that had been shipped 
out of Carbon County to various places. The total in-
volved was $58,962.80. The question was on an item 
of this nature on \vhich a bill of lading had been 
issued on each car, did the four-year statute of limita-
tions apply on the open account, or did a statutory pro-
vision apply that provided for double damages. The 
Court held that the four-year statute of limitations ap-
plied even though there had been a Rio Grande bill of 
lading on each car, and the double damages were not 
allowed. The six-year question was not gone into on that 
case. However, it was compared to a statute that would 
have given double damages. 
In the case of Last Chance Ranch Company vs 
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Erickson found in 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2nd 952, the defend-
ant had conveyed real property to the plaintiff and had 
agreed orally to assign stock in a farm loan associ.:i· 
tion to the plaintiff at once. The same oral agreement 
was reitera@ one year and three months after convey-
ance of the real property. The Court held that the four-
year statute of limitations applied, and that it was not, 
at the time of the action, necessary to transfer the stock 
in the farm loan assocation. 
In the matter of Petty & Riddle, Inc. vs. Lunt, 104 
Utah 130, 138 P. 2d 648, in which the judgment of the 
lower court was reversed upon a presentation by the firm 
of Morris & Matheson, Attorneys at Law, Cedar City, 
Utah, representing the appellant. The plaintiff corpora· 
tion brought an action against the stockholders for the 
contribution toward payment of taxes due and unpaid 
when corporate assets or surplus was divided among 
stockholders. 
The trial court instructed the jury to bring in a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff corporation for $238.86 
on the first cause of action and $530.55 on the second 
cause of action, on the theory that when stockholder' 
divided the assets of the corporation there was an im· 
plied contract to pay the debts. The opposing counsel 
for the plaintiff is one of the attorneys who took this 
action to the Supreme Court for the stockholder, and 
the Supreme Court held that the stockholder had no 
responsibility toward either the individuals that had 
previously owned stock in the corporation or the corp· 
oration itself for corporate debts after the four-year 
statute of limitations had run, on the theory that there 
was an implied oral contract to pay those bills and that 
the four-year statute was applicable. The taxes in ques· 
tion were paid on April 15, 1935, by the corporation and 
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the action against the stockholder Lunt was commenced 
on the 11th of May, 1940. The cause of action arose when 
the corporation became aware that the taxes in ques-
tion were still unpaid, and from that time until the ac-
tion was commenced was more than four years, and 
therefore it was barred by the four-year statute of limi-
tations. 
The case of Juab County Department of Public Wel-
fare vs. Summers, et al., 19 Utah 2d 49, 426 P.2d 1, re-
lied upon by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns in his mem-
orandum decision in the instant case was not 8l, point. 
There, there was a Public Welfare lien agreement which 
was held to be under the six-year statute. This was a 
specific pledge agreement made on a statutory form, 
and on which thereafter money was paid by the Juab 
County Department of Public Welfare, and it is identical 
with a mortgage. It is not in point in the instant case. 
The case of Strand vs. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 6 Utah 2d 279, 312 P.2d 561, also relied on by the 
Honorable J. Harlan Burns in his memorandum decision, 
is against the findings in the memorandum decision. 
In this case there was a written agreement on 
10 December, 1943. Due to difficulties and var-
ious other things, in September, 1944 an oral agree-
ment took place which entirely changed the written 
agreement. The Court held that they changed the writ-
ten agret>ment and plans and specifications to such an 
extent that a new plan had to be drawn. The specifica-
tions were not rewritten, but oral agreements for the 
changes in the specifications were relied on under the 
circumstances, and the contract became an oral one, 
and any claim arising under such a contract is governed 
by the four-year statute of limitations. The action was 
brought under such conditions that it was within the 
six-year period from the original contract, but not with-
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in the four-year period from the oral contract. 
The conclusion from all these cases is that in tni 
instant case Exhibit 1 is nothing more than an acknowl 
edgment and an order to pay, and was not the agre~ 
ment required by Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotateu 
1953, and as a result, Title 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotat· 
ed, 1953, should be applicable to this situation. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 78-
12-23, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, TO 
EXHIBIT 1. 
In pursuance of this, a re-reading of the authoritiei 
in Point I shows that all these items again point out 
that the contract was an oral contract; that exhibit 1. 
is not a contract, but an order to pay after the work wa> 
done, and that under these conditions 78-12-23, Utan 
Code Annotated, 1953, does not apply. 
POINT III 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
HAD RUN BEFORE FILING THE COMPLAINT. 
The four-year statute of limitations had entirely 
run before the filing of the complaint, regardless of any 
item of being out of the State. The latest interpretation 
that could in any way be given to this matter under the 
four-year statute would be four years from the last pay· 
mentor acknowledgment. This came on or about the 2nd 
of January, 1962, according to the testimony of Mr 
Evans on Page 64, commencing at Line 26 of the tran· 
script. Four years from that time would be the 2nd of 
January, 1966. The instant case was not filed until the 
11th of October, 1967. There is no item later than the 
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~?nd of Jnnuary, Hl62, that could in any way be called 
an acknokledgement, and under these conditions, the 
statute of limitation had run before the filing of the 
complaint. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY A 
FINDING OF OUT OF THE STATE EXCEPT 
THE PERIOD FROM 2 JANUARY, 1962 TO I 
APRIL, 1962. 
In Findings of Facts drawn by plaintiff's counsel, 
who is the same counsel who supported the four-year 
statute of limitations in the Petty & Riddle vs. Lunt 
case cited above, in Paragraph 7 the Court found in the 
last lines thereof to the effect that the partners were 
outside of the State of Utah, namely, from January 2, 
1962, to April 1, 1962. In Paragraph 9 the Court found 
as follows: "that the running of said six year statute of 
limitations was tolled from January 2, 1962, to April 1. 
1962. when both partners were outside of the State of 
Utah. and the running of said six year State of Limita-
tions was further tolled by both of said partners being 
out of state of Utah for other substantial periods as 
shown by the evidence herein." A complete review of 
the transcript finds mention in Mr. Pickett's testimony 
of three additional weeks that he was out of the State. 
Thrn, is no other evidence whatsoever to support any 
finding that the defendant was out of the State other 
than the period of 2 January, 1962, to 1 April, 1962, dur-
ing the period that we are concerned about. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as the findings pertaining to the defend-
11 
ant being out of the State are not supported by evi 
dence, there is no substantiation for the finding tha· 
the six-year statute has been tolled by the absence 0 
the defendant from September of 1961 on, inasmuC'h a 
Exhibit 1 is nothing but an order to pay and is not 
contract, as required by the terms of U.C.A. for the six 
year statute in Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotateo 
1953. The four-year statute was applicable. The statut: 
of limitations was tolled, and the complaint was filei 
after the statute of limitations had run, and the matter 
should be dism~ssed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PA TRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants, 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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